
"School of Athens" by Raphael
That quote is from the 20th century French Thomistic philosopher, Etienne Gilson. It is as good a response as any to the title of David Brooks’ op-ed in the New York Times, “The End of Philosophy“. As someone who has loved philosophy since high school (I wrote my senior paper on Hegel and Marx), I found this title just a little bit annoying. I hope I don’t sound defensive, but when it comes to philosophy, David Brooks is full of it. Since I’ve given myself license to write about philosophy in my revised About page, I’m going to kick things off today.
Brooks’ topic in this op-ed is ethics and whether our moral beliefs are merely expressions of emotion or whether reason plays a major role. This topic is very much relevant to politics. Lately, there has been a lot of pressure on President Obama to release the “torture memos” from the Bush administration. The outrage about these memos stems from the widely held belief that torture is wrong. Philosophers look at this outrage and ask: what are we doing when we say “torture is wrong”? When we say that, are we simply expressing our dislike of torture, the way we might dislike an abstract painting or a bad joke? Or are we making a judgment about something that we assume to be an objective fact, such as the distance between the Earth and the Sun? This is one of the central problems in ethics, and in his op-ed, Brooks defends the view that ethics is based on emotion. He writes:
Today, many psychologists, cognitive scientists and even philosophers embrace a different view of morality. In this view, moral thinking is more like aesthetics. As we look around the world, we are constantly evaluating what we see. Seeing and evaluating are not two separate processes. They are linked and basically simultaneous.
As Steven Quartz of the California Institute of Technology said during a recent discussion of ethics sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, “Our brain is computing value at every fraction of a second. Everything that we look at, we form an implicit preference. Some of those make it into our awareness; some of them remain at the level of our unconscious, but … what our brain is for, what our brain has evolved for, is to find what is of value in our environment.”
Think of what happens when you put a new food into your mouth. You don’t have to decide if it’s disgusting. You just know. You don’t have to decide if a landscape is beautiful. You just know.
Moral judgments are like that. They are rapid intuitive decisions and involve the emotion-processing parts of the brain. Most of us make snap moral judgments about what feels fair or not, or what feels good or not. We start doing this when we are babies, before we have language. And even as adults, we often can’t explain to ourselves why something feels wrong.
In other words, reasoning comes later and is often guided by the emotions that preceded it. Or as Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia memorably wrote, “The emotions are, in fact, in charge of the temple of morality, and … moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as a high priest.”
Now, I believe in evolution, and I believe that evolution does play an important role in explaining how humans came to adopt morality. I also agree with Brooks that psychology and cognitive science are important in helping us understand how our brains process information when we make moral judgments. But I do not agree that moral judgments like “torture is wrong” are simply expressions of emotions. Nor do I believe that psychology is relevant to answering this question. There are several reasons for this:
First, when we disagree about moral questions, we seem to be arguing about facts, not simply criticizing the other person for having the wrong emotional reaction. If you believe torture is a very serious wrong and you are arguing with someone who believes that torture is just fine, it doesn’t seem accurate to describe your disagreement as matters of taste.
Second, there are many times in life when we face moral dilemmas (both large and small) and it’s not at all clear what we should do. Brooks’ statement that we make “snap moral judgments” that are comparable to whether food tastes good or whether a landscape is beautiful is too simplistic.
Third, Brooks, like a lot of people in our culture today, places too much weight in science without being adequately acquainted with the philosophy he is declaring dead. Many philosophers do not believe that “expressivism” versus “realism” can be decided by the experiments that psychologists do. That is for a simple reason. Psychology can explain how we form moral judgments–the brain processes that lead us to view some things as right and other things as wrong. But even if we had a complete explanation of how the brain functions when we make moral judgments, we would still be left with the question, “is torture really wrong”? Then we would have to engage in philosophy.
Fourth, although it is unquestionably true that emotions guide us in our deliberations and help us make moral decisions, that doesn’t imply that moral judgments simply are expressions of emotions. That conclusion does not follow.
Finally, one complaint about Brooks’ op-ed that isn’t an argument against expressivism: you can’t just dismiss Socrates in a paragraph or two, no matter how sexy and in vogue cognitive science is. Brooks starts his essay with two words: “Socrates talked.” Well, the entire work of Plato is devoted to Socrates “talking.” Socrates, by the way, was one of the greatest philosophical minds in the history of the subject.
Now, please remind me: why am I trying to refute the philosophical arguments of David Brooks?